Tom Dispatch: Prisons, Drones, and Black Ops in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, "victory" came early, with the US invasion of 2001. Only then did the trouble begin. Ever since the US occupation managed to revive the Taliban, one of the least popular of popular movements in memory, the official talk, year after year, has been of modest "progress," of limited "success," of enemy advances "blunted" of "corners" provisionally turned, and always such talk has been accompanied by grim on-the-ground reports of gross corruption, fixed elections, massive desertions from the Afghan army and police, "ghost" soldiers, and the like. Year after year, ever more American and NATO money has been poured into the training of a security force so humongous that, given the impoverished Afghan government, it will hardly be owned and paid for by Washington until hell freezes over or until it disintegrates: $11 billion in 2011 and a similar figure for 2012, and year after year stories appear like the recent one from Reuters, that began: "Only 1 percent of Afghan police and soldiers are capable of operating independently, a top US commander said Wednesday, raising further doubts about whether Afghan forces will be able to take on a still-potent insurgency as the West withdraws." And year after year, the response to such dismal news is to pour in more money and advisers. In the meantime, Afghans in army or police uniforms have been blowing away those advisers in startling numbers and with a regularity for which there is no precedent in modern times. (You might have to reach back to the Sepoy Mutiny in British India of the nineteenth century to find a similar sense of loathing resulting in similar bloody acts.)