Lt. Col Daniel L Davis: Truth, Lies and Afghanistan

I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with US troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army's Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy.  Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Khandahar , Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces. What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by US military leaders about conditions on the ground. Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress. Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level. My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-08 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the US Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs, among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, R. Texas. As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops.